The Latter-day Ghidorah Raises Its Threatening Heads
The international community has witnessed the division of global interests
into two diametrically opposing camps. The new one consists of three countries
that have been insisting on their perceived rightful places under the sun,
which they have finally fulfilled – though it’s only their places, outsiders that
have not yet pledged fealties are not allowed.
The other camp consists of countries that have traditionally stood
in direct opposition to the self-anointed ones.
President Donald J. Trump, Russian führer
Vladimir Putin and Chinese dictator Xi Jinping, considered the sinister nuclear
powers, decided to meet in Shenzhen, China, to crystalize their roles in the
international community, which they believe have been swept under the carpet by
the security needs of NATO, Western Europe and the former captive nations of
Russian subjugation. For them, the fate of Ukraine is an example of what awaits
them.
The meeting of the three – two dictators and a wannabee – clarifies
their belief that “might makes right” with the extra warning about not getting
involved in their spheres of influence. In other words, don’t tread on us. Rather
than forging new mutually beneficial ironclad diplomatic fences, the three
leaders met to reinforce and legitimize a political philosophy that declares “We
are powerful. We have our spheres of influence. Other nations should stay out
of our way.” Furthermore, their combined posture screams: “We decide what
happens in our respective geopolitical neighborhoods.”
For all intents and purposes, that is the Cold War language of
spheres of influence, not the language of sovereign equality.
In short, displaying a structure of the famed Mafia Commission, in
which Washington, Beijing, and Moscow play rivals on almost everything else, like
the heads of the organized crime families, in reality they share an identical
interest in protecting sovereign impunity—essentially telling international
legal bodies that great-power conflicts and sitting leaders are off-limits.
While
the Beijing stagecraft projected a unified anti-Western front, the underlying
bilateral relationships are asymmetrical. Russia is increasingly dependent on
North Korean munitions and troops, as well as Chinese dual-use tech and economic
lifelines, making Putin the junior partner in Beijing's orbit. China
balances its support for Moscow and Pyongyang against its need to preserve
trade access with the US and Europe, as well as its discomfort with Kim Jong Un’s
nuclear brinkmanship destabilizing East Asia.
Donald Trump has consistently framed his
personal rapport with authoritarian leaders—particularly Russian President
Vladimir Putin, Chinese President Xi Jinping, and North Korean leader Kim Jong
Un – not as an ideological endorsement, but as a strategic diplomatic asset
that prevents global conflict and benefits the world. In recent years, at least since the advent of Russia’s latest war
against Ukraine, Trump defied his Republican Party’s traditional support for
the captive nations and has consistently supported the Russian führer.
Across
both his current summit diplomacy in Shenzhen (November 2026) and his broader
public remarks over the years, Trump’s statements on the global value of these
relationships generally fall into three themes.
During
his historic three-way summit with Xi and Putin in Shenzhen, China, Trump
emphasized that direct, personal engagement among the world’s top nuclear
powers is essential for global stability. Call it “Pax Shenzhen,” the three
frenemies have taken it upon themselves to define peace and stability, and
safeguard at least their versions of it. And the outsiders, so far, are
allowing them to do so.
Trump
noted: “We are really making history.” — Opening his trilateral meeting with Xi
and Putin, arguing that the US, China, and Russia have a “special
responsibility” to work together.
“No
peace was ever forged by declining opportunities for engagement.” — Defending
the unprecedented three-way talks as a necessary step toward reducing nuclear
stockpiles and resolving regional conflicts.
“Wonderful things can come out of this —
or at least start.” — Speaking alongside Putin ahead of their bilateral
sidelines meeting in Shenzhen, where Trump referred to the Russian leader as “my
friend” and added, “We've had a great relationship for many years.” That
statement explains why Trump exhibits a lukewarm attitude toward Russian petty
crimes or felonies.
Throughout his first term, his 2024
campaign, and his second term, Trump has repeatedly argued that maintaining
warm personal ties with nuclear-armed despots is a common-sense safeguard for
global security.
“Getting along with
Russia is a good thing, not a bad thing.” — A recurring staple of his foreign
policy speeches and rallies, often paired with the argument that cooperation
with Moscow could help solve major international crises. However, Trump giving
Russia a privileged sphere of influence has
translated into ongoing Russian aggression against Ukraine and the denial of
its right to determine its own future.
“It is
nice to get along with someone that has a lot of nuclear weapons or otherwise.”
— Reflecting on his personal relationship with Kim Jong Un during a July 2024
rally, arguing that their rapport prevented a catastrophic conflict on the
Korean Peninsula.
“I think you would have nuclear
holocaust if I didn’t deal with North Korea.” — Claiming during legal
deposition testimony (made public in 2024) that his personal diplomacy with Kim
averted a global disaster.
While Trump,
whose preference for personal diplomacy with authoritarian
leaders and his emphasis on national power raise questions about whether
American foreign policy is becoming transactional rather than principled, frequently touts the global benefits of his own “friendships” with Xi,
Putin, and Kim, he has reacted far more critically when those leaders project
solidarity without him—most notably during the September 2025
Beijing military parade where Xi, Putin, and Kim appeared together:
"Give
my warmest regards to Vladimir Putin, and Kim Jong Un, as you conspire against
The United States of America." — Posted by Trump on Truth Social to Xi
Jinping as the three leaders stood together in Beijing, illustrating the
tension between his belief in personal leader-to-leader diplomacy and his
suspicion of an organized anti-US bloc.
The war against Ukraine was not broached but Ukraine as such was mentioned
as one of the central topics of
discussion behind closed doors at Thursday’s session. The three did not produce
any concrete breakthrough, and Kyiv was omitted entirely from their
post-meeting joint “peace declaration.”
What
each leader said publicly regarding Ukraine across the trilateral meeting and
their earlier bilateral sessions includes:
Donald Trump: Trump directly tied
U.S.–China cooperation to ending the conflict. Ahead of the three-way talks, he
told Xi Jinping, "We’re looking to both help with respect to the war with
Russia and Ukraine. I’d like to see it ended." At the start of the trilateral
session, Trump confirmed that the three leaders would discuss the war alongside
nuclear arms reduction, arguing that "no peace was ever forged by
declining opportunities for engagement." He also took aim at the
International Criminal Court (ICC)—which issued an arrest warrant for Putin in
2023 over the unlawful deportation of Ukrainian children—calling the court “out
of control.”
Vladimir Putin: Putin explicitly framed
Ukraine as an area of common ground among the three powers. In his opening
remarks, he stated that the U.S., China, and Russia have “numerous shared
interests in the settlement of regional conflicts, including obviously the
conflict in Ukraine,” adding that the three nations share a responsibility for
international peace and security. Following his 40-minute bilateral meeting
with Trump—which Kremlin aides confirmed was dominated by the war in
Ukraine—Putin reportedly emerged in an "excellent mood," though no
specifics of their exchange were released.
Xi
Jinping: Notably, Xi avoided mentioning Ukraine by name in his public remarks
during the trilateral session. Instead, he kept his comments broad, stating
that "when major powers live in harmony, the world is at peace," and
urging joint responsibility to address global challenges. (In recent weeks,
Beijing has maintained that Ukraine is primarily a "European war"
requiring European involvement at the negotiating table.)
While the joint “peace
declaration” issued afterward through Chinese and Russian state media avoided
mentioning Ukraine or Kyiv directly, it implicitly backed Moscow’s position by
calling for UN reforms and declaring that international courts "must not
abuse their jurisdiction"—emphasizing state consent and the immunity of
state officials in a clear swipe at the ICC's war crimes warrant against Putin. The disturbing feature
is that all three can speak about peace and stability while reserving
extraordinary privileges for themselves. The joint declaration’s silence on
Ukraine makes this concern especially legitimate.
For
example, in Point 3 of their Shenzhen declaration, the three leaders stated
that "the principle of state consent and respect
for immunities of State officials are of paramount importance" and warned that the International Criminal Court
(ICC) and similar bodies "must not abuse their jurisdiction.”
In
diplomatic terms, that phrasing sends two distinct signals:
1. The Legal Hook (“State Consent”):
None of the three countries—the US, China, or Russia—are members of the ICC
(none have ratified the Rome Statute). Under traditional international law,
treaties only bind countries that sign them. However, the ICC asserts
jurisdiction if a crime occurs on the territory of a member state (or a state that accepts its
jurisdiction, like Ukraine) or via a UN Security Council referral. By calling
this an "abuse of jurisdiction," Trump, Xi, and Putin are arguing
that a court cannot prosecute citizens or leaders of non-member superpowers
without their government's explicit permission.
2. The Political Turf War (“Immunities
of State Officials”): The ICC's foundational rule is that no one is immune—not
even a sitting head of state—when accused of war crimes or crimes against
humanity. That is how the court issued an arrest warrant for Vladimir Putin in
2023 (and why it has pursued cases involving U.S. personnel in Afghanistan and
Israeli leaders in Gaza, which infuriated Washington). By demanding
"respect for immunities of State officials", the three leaders are
asserting a great-power carve-out: major states handle their own security,
wars, and officials internally, and supranational courts have no business
policing them.
They have composed their version
of international legal and other human policies that give clever violators to
squirm away from justice.
At the end of this strange summit,
America fortunately still remains a democracy, but its claim to be democracy's
leading champion is increasingly under examination. There is an important
distinction between America as a nation and the foreign policy of a particular
administration.
America still has:
A
Constitution and independent courts.
Elections
and competing political parties.
A free
press and independent civic organizations.
Millions
of citizens who believe in democratic principles.
Allies who
continue to look to American leadership.
But America’s leadership requires more than possessing democratic
institutions. It requires defending the principles those institutions
represent. How can Washington credibly defend Ukrainian sovereignty while
entertaining arrangements with Moscow that might compromise it?
How can America condemn authoritarian expansion while appearing
comfortable with the idea that powerful countries have privileged rights over
smaller neighbors?
And how can it champion international law while supporting
political immunity for leaders who might otherwise face international
accountability?
These are not merely rhetorical questions. The summit gives them
renewed urgency.
Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin discussed the postwar world. The
fate of nations in Eastern Europe was profoundly affected by decisions made by
the victorious powers.
Ukraine knows what that meant because it and the nations in
Eastern Europe became enslaved when a perceived stronger nation rose to the surface
without any opposition.
Today, we see three leaders invoking their vision of their shared
responsibility as World War II victors while discussing the international
order. The historical symbolism is extraordinary.
But there is one fundamental difference we must insist upon. The
world of 2026 cannot be governed by the logic of 1945.
Ukraine is not a bargaining chip. Taiwan is not a bargaining chip.
Smaller nations are not possessions of their more powerful neighbors. Sovereignty
cannot depend on the size of a country’s army.
A nation’s right to exist, to govern itself, and to choose its
future must never be determined by the military power of its near or distant neighbors.
That is what Ukraine is fighting for.
And perhaps the most important question facing the United States
today is not whether it can remain the world’s strongest democracy but whether
it still wants to be the world’s leading defender of freedom.