Russia, USA & PRC Plan New Security Arrangement
On one hand, the unholy trinity lead by Russia is building a case for constructing a new global security framework, while on the other hand Ukraine and its allies are questioning why?Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha expressed point blank that a new structure is not needed. Sybiha made this observation in a post on X on November 15, 2026, directly pushing back against renewed Russian proposals to establish a "new security architecture in Europe."
No New Order Needed: Sybiha stated plainly: "Frankly, Europe does not need a new security order. It already has one, which Russia keeps violating. The best plan for a safe and free Europe is to end Russia's aggression against Ukraine."
Indeed, many global security mechanisms are in place for honorable countries and leaders to abide by. Addressing Vladimir Putin's push to redraw European security and spheres of influence, Sybiha wrote: "In his dreams, he sees himself at Yalta in 1945. The problem is, to propose ideas on that scale, you first need to win a world war."
And that is Putin’s goal: to lead his own global team. To underscore that Moscow lacks the leverage to demand a continental overhaul, Sybiha pointed out that Russia has failed to achieve its invasion objectives—suffering more than 1.6 million casualties (including 54,400 in October 2026 alone) while spending four years and eight months trying to "nearly capture" the village of Mala Tokmachka in Zaporizhzhia Oblast.
He emphasized that at this stage, the maximum Russia, as incompetent as it is, can realistically negotiate is a fair ceasefire along the current line of contact, not new spheres of influence.
Sybiha's comments come amid heightened diplomatic discussions—including recent US-brokered talks in Abu Dhabi and upcoming high-level meetings involving Washington, Moscow, and Beijing—where Moscow has revived its longstanding demand to renegotiate post-Cold War security frameworks.
EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas echoed Sybiha's stance, stating that Europe already has an established security architecture (centered on NATO and the EU) and that the focus must be on integrating Ukraine into it rather than rewriting the rules to accommodate Russian aggression.
In other words, Russia is arm twisting the world to formulate a new security structure, according to its security needs, with Putin on top and Trump buying its plan.
That scenario captures the exact alarm currently ringing across Kyiv and European capitals following the November 10–11 trilateral talks in Abu Dhabi.
Rather than treating the war in Ukraine as a standalone conflict requiring a ceasefire, Moscow has successfully used the negotiations to change the global emphasis and reframe the agenda around rolling back the entire post-Cold War security order—and Washington’s willingness to entertain that framing has triggered sharp concern and pushback.
Moscow is attempting to replace a ceasefire with a "Grand Bargain": Ahead of and during the Abu Dhabi talks, Russian negotiators refused to engage on an immediate or energy ceasefire—claiming they lacked the authority —while insisting that the core focus of talks must be designing a "new postwar security system for Europe." By linking peace in Ukraine to a broader continental reset, Moscow turns Ukraine into a bargaining chip in a larger bid to reassert a sphere of influence and weaken NATO.
For the first time since Putin began issuing ultimatums to roll back NATO in 2021, a sitting US administration has agreed to put a "long-term European security architecture" directly onto the negotiating table alongside the war. By adding another agenda item to the negotiations, Moscow is not only hoping to confuse the goal but also delay any conclusion in its war against Ukraine. It hopes this delay will help it capture more Ukrainian land.
US envoys Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff—who traveled from Abu Dhabi to Moscow to meet Putin before meeting President Zelenskyy in Dublin—have argued that broader security arrangements between Russia and Europe must be part of a final deal, even floating reviving the suspended NATO-Russia Council and lifting sanctions.
While US officials point out they have proposed non-NATO, "Article 5-style" bilateral security guarantees for Ukraine (which Moscow still resists), Washington has simultaneously signaled openness to discussing limits on Ukraine's military autonomy and excluding NATO troops from Ukrainian soil. It is unconscionable how Moscow has steamrolled its agenda to the forefront of world attention.
President Volodymyr Zelenskyy warned on November 14 that the new European security framework floated by the US risks benefiting Putin, while Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha rejected the premise outright—arguing that Russia is trying to extract a "Yalta-style" settlement at the negotiating table that it has failed to win on the battlefield.
European leaders—who were largely sidelined from the Abu Dhabi room despite Secretary of State Marco Rubio's assurances—fear Washington is allowing Moscow to dictate the terms of continental security. They rightly insist that they should participate in discussions on continental security.
Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni criticized the "disorderly" parallel tracks for weakening Europe's voice, while policy analysts warn that legitimizing Russia's demand to "redesign" European security effectively rewards coercion and places the dismantling of NATO's eastern posture up for negotiation.
Both Canada and European leaders have forcefully rejected Moscow’s attempt to rewrite Europe's security order—and pushed back firmly against Washington's willingness to negotiate over their heads.
On November 14, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney explicitly drew a red line against Moscow's demands—which include pulling NATO back to its 1997 borders and signing bilateral non-aggression pacts with individual allies. Carney stated plainly: "The security architecture for free Europe will be determined by free Europe and NATO, not by Russia and a redux of the Minsk agreement."
Emphasizing that Ottawa "will never walk away from any ally," Carney argued that past attempts to appease or contain Moscow without genuine deterrence failed, and insisted that any lasting peace requires coordinated North American and European security guarantees rather than concessions that weaken NATO.
EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas dismissed the premise that Europe needs a new framework, noting that the continent already has an established security architecture that Russia repeatedly violates—and adding that Moscow cannot act as a "security guarantor" for Europe. Estonian Prime Minister Kristen Michal similarly characterized Russia's demands as "psychological games" designed to extract strategic concessions while avoiding an actual ceasefire.
Speaking in Dublin on November 12 alongside European Political Community leaders, French President Emmanuel Macron rejected the idea of Washington and Moscow deciding Europe's fate without European participation: "At the end of the day, we will be the ones to define and decide for our future security as Europeans." European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen also maintained that wider European security discussions should not even occur until Russia agrees to a ceasefire in Ukraine.
Following intense diplomatic friction over being excluded from the main Abu Dhabi negotiating room, European pressure forced U.S. envoy Jared Kushner and President Zelenskyy to confirm in Dublin that a European negotiating team will join the next round of talks—though European capitals are still debating whether to send a single unified envoy, as Washington and Moscow prefer, or a broader delegation.
With the West scrambling to draft a solid reply, the nemesis of European and global peace and stability are proceeding with their meeting next week.
The dynamics look less like a coordinated three-way conspiracy and more like three competing great powers converging on a transactional "spheres of influence" model—most visibly illustrated by the unprecedented ghidorah summit of Trump–Putin–Xi scheduled alongside the APEC meetings in Shenzhen, China, on November 18–19, 2026.
Rather than acting as a unified bloc, Washington, Moscow, and Beijing each have distinct motives that happen to erode the multilateral, rules-based order that Europe and Canada defend.
Russia is the primary designer of this "new security architecture" push. Having failed to conquer Ukraine militarily, the Kremlin is using diplomacy to extract what it could not win on the battlefield—specifically rolling back NATO’s eastern posture and re-establishing a recognized Russian sphere of influence in Eastern Europe.
Moscow relies on Chinese economic and dual-use industrial backing to sustain its war effort, while framing its demands as part of a broader "multipolar" shift against Western hegemony.
However, the US is not working in lockstep with Moscow and Beijing—in fact, Washington views China as its primary strategic rival and has pushed back on certain Russian demands (such as still entertaining non-NATO security guarantees for Ukraine). The Trump administration's preference for bilateral or trilateral "great power" dealmaking over traditional alliances plays directly into Moscow’s hands.
Ahead of the November 18–19 summit in Shenzhen, senior U.S. officials stated that the Trump–Putin–Xi meeting will focus on nuclear arms reduction and Iran rather than Ukraine, insisting Ukraine is on a "separate track." Yet Kremlin aide Yuri Ushakov explicitly linked the Shenzhen trip to continuing Ukraine settlement talks between Trump and Putin—fueling fears in Kyiv and European capitals that major powers are carving up global security arrangements behind closed doors.
Beijing publicly calls for addressing "legitimate security concerns" and resolving "root causes"—language that directly mirrors Moscow’s justification for invading Ukraine—while quietly sustaining Russia's defense industrial base.
China is not orchestrating the European security proposals, nor does it want to play second fiddle to US diplomacy. Instead, Beijing benefits from a protracted conflict that drains Western resources, fractures transatlantic unity between the US and Europe, and normalizes the idea that major powers—not smaller sovereign nations or alliances like NATO—set the rules of regional security.
In short, while Washington, Moscow, and Beijing are rivals rather than a coordinated alliance, their overlapping willingness to sideline middle powers and multilateral institutions creates the exact "great-power concert" dynamic that Kyiv, Ottawa, and European capitals are fighting to prevent.
Globally, this remarkably sharp analogy mirrors the classic "Five Families" commission model. There is no formal treaty binding them, and each boss still views the others as rivals who would happily take over their turf, yet they share an unspoken interest in preserving a system where only the heads of the major families get to sit at the table and carve up territory.
In international relations, theorists actually have a formal name for this exact dynamic: a Concert of Great Powers (similar to the 19th-century Concert of Europe), or what critics today call a "Yalta 2.0" mentality.
When you look at Washington, Moscow, and Beijing through that "commission" lens, the mechanics line up cleanly.
In a mafia commission, the biggest sin isn't extortion—it's encroaching on another family's neighborhood without a sit-down. Similarly, Moscow wants Eastern Europe recognized as its exclusive neighborhood, Beijing wants the same deference in the Indo-Pacific and over Taiwan, and Washington signals a retreat toward a "Western Hemisphere first" posture while treating global crises as bilateral real-estate deals.
Just as lower-tier crews or families aren't invited to Commission sit-downs, sovereign nations like Ukraine—and middle-power alliances like the EU and Canada—are treated as subjects to be negotiated about rather than partners to negotiate with.
None of the three capitals trusts the others. Yet they can temporarily align on specific "projects"—whether it's freezing a conflict on terms favorable to a strongman, sidelining multilateral bodies like NATO and the UN, or rewriting nuclear and trade frameworks at a summit in Shenzhen—because doing so reinforces the idea that might makes right and that only the biggest players hold real sovereignty.
That is precisely why Foreign Minister Sybiha invoked Yalta 1945, and why Prime Minister Carney and European leaders are pushing back so fiercely. Once the principle is accepted that the "big bosses" can redraw security lines over the heads of smaller democracies, no non-nuclear or middle-power state is truly secure.
That captures the coercive logic of the entire setup—the classic Thucydidean maxim ("the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must") dressed up in modern diplomatic language.
When great powers frame an arrangement as "realistic" or "inevitable," the "offer" presented to smaller or frontline states comes with an implicit threat: accept our terms for your sovereignty, borders, and alliances, or lose our backing and face the aggressor alone.
Yet history—and the current diplomatic pushback—shows why middle and smaller states resist that script.
Individually, a single country can be cornered into an "offer it can't refuse." Collectively, however, Europe and Canada represent massive economic, industrial, and financial weight—enough to sustain Ukraine and complicate any deal made over their heads.
As Prime Minister Carney and Minister Sybiha both noted, that insisting on a seat at the table and rejecting Moscow's framing that post-Cold War security is up for renegotiation, Kyiv, Ottawa, and European capitals are trying to break the "Commission" dynamic before those terms can be locked in.
It really does read like a classic editorial theme—comparing modern great-power transactionalism to the unwritten rules of a syndicate, and examining whether democratic alliances still have the resolve to say "no" to a rigged table.
Ukraine, Canada, EU, NATO and the former captive nations of Russian subjugation have their work cut out for them to stop this modern ghidorah.