Thursday, November 19, 2026

The Latter-day Ghidorah Raises Its Threatening Heads


The international community has witnessed the division of global interests into two diametrically opposing camps. The new one consists of three countries that have been insisting on their perceived rightful places under the sun, which they have finally fulfilled – though it’s only their places, outsiders that have not yet pledged fealties are not allowed.

The other camp consists of countries that have traditionally stood in direct opposition to the self-anointed ones.

President Donald J. Trump, Russian führer Vladimir Putin and Chinese dictator Xi Jinping, considered the sinister nuclear powers, decided to meet in Shenzhen, China, to crystalize their roles in the international community, which they believe have been swept under the carpet by the security needs of NATO, Western Europe and the former captive nations of Russian subjugation. For them, the fate of Ukraine is an example of what awaits them.

The meeting of the three – two dictators and a wannabee – clarifies their belief that “might makes right” with the extra warning about not getting involved in their spheres of influence. In other words, don’t tread on us. Rather than forging new mutually beneficial ironclad diplomatic fences, the three leaders met to reinforce and legitimize a political philosophy that declares “We are powerful. We have our spheres of influence. Other nations should stay out of our way.” Furthermore, their combined posture screams: “We decide what happens in our respective geopolitical neighborhoods.”

For all intents and purposes, that is the Cold War language of spheres of influence, not the language of sovereign equality.

In short, displaying a structure of the famed Mafia Commission, in which Washington, Beijing, and Moscow play rivals on almost everything else, like the heads of the organized crime families, in reality they share an identical interest in protecting sovereign impunity—essentially telling international legal bodies that great-power conflicts and sitting leaders are off-limits.

While the Beijing stagecraft projected a unified anti-Western front, the underlying bilateral relationships are asymmetrical. Russia is increasingly dependent on North Korean munitions and troops, as well as Chinese dual-use tech and economic lifelines, making Putin the junior partner in Beijing's orbit. China balances its support for Moscow and Pyongyang against its need to preserve trade access with the US and Europe, as well as its discomfort with Kim Jong Un’s nuclear brinkmanship destabilizing East Asia.

Donald Trump has consistently framed his personal rapport with authoritarian leaders—particularly Russian President Vladimir Putin, Chinese President Xi Jinping, and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un – not as an ideological endorsement, but as a strategic diplomatic asset that prevents global conflict and benefits the world. In recent years, at least since the advent of Russia’s latest war against Ukraine, Trump defied his Republican Party’s traditional support for the captive nations and has consistently supported the Russian führer.

Across both his current summit diplomacy in Shenzhen (November 2026) and his broader public remarks over the years, Trump’s statements on the global value of these relationships generally fall into three themes. 

During his historic three-way summit with Xi and Putin in Shenzhen, China, Trump emphasized that direct, personal engagement among the world’s top nuclear powers is essential for global stability. Call it “Pax Shenzhen,” the three frenemies have taken it upon themselves to define peace and stability, and safeguard at least their versions of it. And the outsiders, so far, are allowing them to do so.

Trump noted: “We are really making history.” — Opening his trilateral meeting with Xi and Putin, arguing that the US, China, and Russia have a “special responsibility” to work together. 

“No peace was ever forged by declining opportunities for engagement.” — Defending the unprecedented three-way talks as a necessary step toward reducing nuclear stockpiles and resolving regional conflicts. 

“Wonderful things can come out of this — or at least start.” — Speaking alongside Putin ahead of their bilateral sidelines meeting in Shenzhen, where Trump referred to the Russian leader as “my friend” and added, “We've had a great relationship for many years.” That statement explains why Trump exhibits a lukewarm attitude toward Russian petty crimes or felonies.  

Throughout his first term, his 2024 campaign, and his second term, Trump has repeatedly argued that maintaining warm personal ties with nuclear-armed despots is a common-sense safeguard for global security.

“Getting along with Russia is a good thing, not a bad thing.” — A recurring staple of his foreign policy speeches and rallies, often paired with the argument that cooperation with Moscow could help solve major international crises. However, Trump giving Russia a privileged sphere of influence has translated into ongoing Russian aggression against Ukraine and the denial of its right to determine its own future.

“It is nice to get along with someone that has a lot of nuclear weapons or otherwise.” — Reflecting on his personal relationship with Kim Jong Un during a July 2024 rally, arguing that their rapport prevented a catastrophic conflict on the Korean Peninsula. 

“I think you would have nuclear holocaust if I didn’t deal with North Korea.” — Claiming during legal deposition testimony (made public in 2024) that his personal diplomacy with Kim averted a global disaster. 

While Trump, whose preference for personal diplomacy with authoritarian leaders and his emphasis on national power raise questions about whether American foreign policy is becoming transactional rather than principled, frequently touts the global benefits of his own “friendships” with Xi, Putin, and Kim, he has reacted far more critically when those leaders project solidarity without him—most notably during the September 2025 Beijing military parade where Xi, Putin, and Kim appeared together: 

"Give my warmest regards to Vladimir Putin, and Kim Jong Un, as you conspire against The United States of America." — Posted by Trump on Truth Social to Xi Jinping as the three leaders stood together in Beijing, illustrating the tension between his belief in personal leader-to-leader diplomacy and his suspicion of an organized anti-US bloc.

The war against Ukraine was not broached but Ukraine as such was mentioned as one of the central topics of discussion behind closed doors at Thursday’s session. The three did not produce any concrete breakthrough, and Kyiv was omitted entirely from their post-meeting joint “peace declaration.”

What each leader said publicly regarding Ukraine across the trilateral meeting and their earlier bilateral sessions includes:

Donald Trump: Trump directly tied U.S.–China cooperation to ending the conflict. Ahead of the three-way talks, he told Xi Jinping, "We’re looking to both help with respect to the war with Russia and Ukraine. I’d like to see it ended." At the start of the trilateral session, Trump confirmed that the three leaders would discuss the war alongside nuclear arms reduction, arguing that "no peace was ever forged by declining opportunities for engagement." He also took aim at the International Criminal Court (ICC)—which issued an arrest warrant for Putin in 2023 over the unlawful deportation of Ukrainian children—calling the court “out of control.”

Vladimir Putin: Putin explicitly framed Ukraine as an area of common ground among the three powers. In his opening remarks, he stated that the U.S., China, and Russia have “numerous shared interests in the settlement of regional conflicts, including obviously the conflict in Ukraine,” adding that the three nations share a responsibility for international peace and security. Following his 40-minute bilateral meeting with Trump—which Kremlin aides confirmed was dominated by the war in Ukraine—Putin reportedly emerged in an "excellent mood," though no specifics of their exchange were released. 

Xi Jinping: Notably, Xi avoided mentioning Ukraine by name in his public remarks during the trilateral session. Instead, he kept his comments broad, stating that "when major powers live in harmony, the world is at peace," and urging joint responsibility to address global challenges. (In recent weeks, Beijing has maintained that Ukraine is primarily a "European war" requiring European involvement at the negotiating table.) 

While the joint “peace declaration” issued afterward through Chinese and Russian state media avoided mentioning Ukraine or Kyiv directly, it implicitly backed Moscow’s position by calling for UN reforms and declaring that international courts "must not abuse their jurisdiction"—emphasizing state consent and the immunity of state officials in a clear swipe at the ICC's war crimes warrant against Putin.  The disturbing feature is that all three can speak about peace and stability while reserving extraordinary privileges for themselves. The joint declaration’s silence on Ukraine makes this concern especially legitimate.

For example, in Point 3 of their Shenzhen declaration, the three leaders stated that "the principle of state consent and respect for immunities of State officials are of paramount importance" and warned that the International Criminal Court (ICC) and similar bodies "must not abuse their jurisdiction.”

In diplomatic terms, that phrasing sends two distinct signals:

1. The Legal Hook (“State Consent”): None of the three countries—the US, China, or Russia—are members of the ICC (none have ratified the Rome Statute). Under traditional international law, treaties only bind countries that sign them. However, the ICC asserts jurisdiction if a crime occurs on the territory of a member state (or a state that accepts its jurisdiction, like Ukraine) or via a UN Security Council referral. By calling this an "abuse of jurisdiction," Trump, Xi, and Putin are arguing that a court cannot prosecute citizens or leaders of non-member superpowers without their government's explicit permission. 

2. The Political Turf War (“Immunities of State Officials”): The ICC's foundational rule is that no one is immune—not even a sitting head of state—when accused of war crimes or crimes against humanity. That is how the court issued an arrest warrant for Vladimir Putin in 2023 (and why it has pursued cases involving U.S. personnel in Afghanistan and Israeli leaders in Gaza, which infuriated Washington). By demanding "respect for immunities of State officials", the three leaders are asserting a great-power carve-out: major states handle their own security, wars, and officials internally, and supranational courts have no business policing them. 

They have composed their version of international legal and other human policies that give clever violators to squirm away from justice.

At the end of this strange summit, America fortunately still remains a democracy, but its claim to be democracy's leading champion is increasingly under examination. There is an important distinction between America as a nation and the foreign policy of a particular administration.

America still has:

A Constitution and independent courts.

Elections and competing political parties.

A free press and independent civic organizations.

Millions of citizens who believe in democratic principles.

Allies who continue to look to American leadership.

But America’s leadership requires more than possessing democratic institutions. It requires defending the principles those institutions represent. How can Washington credibly defend Ukrainian sovereignty while entertaining arrangements with Moscow that might compromise it?

How can America condemn authoritarian expansion while appearing comfortable with the idea that powerful countries have privileged rights over smaller neighbors?

And how can it champion international law while supporting political immunity for leaders who might otherwise face international accountability?

These are not merely rhetorical questions. The summit gives them renewed urgency.

Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin discussed the postwar world. The fate of nations in Eastern Europe was profoundly affected by decisions made by the victorious powers.

Ukraine knows what that meant because it and the nations in Eastern Europe became enslaved when a perceived stronger nation rose to the surface without any opposition.

Today, we see three leaders invoking their vision of their shared responsibility as World War II victors while discussing the international order. The historical symbolism is extraordinary.

But there is one fundamental difference we must insist upon. The world of 2026 cannot be governed by the logic of 1945.

Ukraine is not a bargaining chip. Taiwan is not a bargaining chip. Smaller nations are not possessions of their more powerful neighbors. Sovereignty cannot depend on the size of a country’s army.

A nation’s right to exist, to govern itself, and to choose its future must never be determined by the military power of its near or distant neighbors.

That is what Ukraine is fighting for.

And perhaps the most important question facing the United States today is not whether it can remain the world’s strongest democracy but whether it still wants to be the world’s leading defender of freedom. 

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